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Queen Elizabeth’s Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands in the 1570s 
 In 1576, after Edmund Grindal, archbishop of Canterbury, presumed to lecture Queen 
Elizabeth on the importance of preaching and on her duty to listen to such lectures, his influence 
diminished precipitously, and leadership of the established English church fell to Bishop Aylmer. 
Grindal’s friends on the queen’s Privy Council, “forward” Calvinists (or ultra-Protestants), were 
powerless to save him from the consequences of his indiscretion, which damaged the ultras’ 
other initiatives’ chances of success. This paper concerns one of those initiatives. From the late 
1560s, they urged their queen “actively” to intervene in the Dutch wars. They collaborated with 
Calvinists on the Continent who befriended Prince William of Orange and who hoped to help 
him hold together a coalition of religiously reformed and Roman Catholic insurgents in the 
seventeen provinces of the Low Countries.  The English ultra-Protestants would have their 
government send money, munitions, and men in arms to the Netherlands, to tip the balance 
against viceroys sent by King Philip II of Spain. Grindal’s setback undermined the English 
Calvinists’ efforts to form an Anglo-Dutch alliance which, they assumed, would boost the 
prospects for an international Protestant league.1 Yet Elizabeth did assist the Dutch as they 
wrestled with decisions forced on them by developments in the Netherlands during the 1570s, 
and she did so more consistently and more cleverly than many historians of Tudor diplomacy 
have thought. 
 Two competing assessments determine the way questions are formulated in the study of 
the queen’s and regime’s Dutch diplomacy. The general consensus is that she was indecisive and 
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inconsistent. Paul Hammer characterizes Elizabeth’s responses to the crises in the Low Countries 
as a “zigzag of different” (“even contradictory”) maneuvers. Wallace McCaffrey and R. B. 
Wernham agree that England’s “hesitations and gyrations” do not pass as coherent, creditable 
policy. Charles Wilson scolds Elizabeth for being timid and tepid--incapable of enthusiasm for 
“a great cause.” But David J.B. Trim’s striking counterthrust depicts the queen’s overtures to 
Netherlanders as part of her courageous--and “confessionally driven”--foreign policy; Trim 
replaces “hesitation” and “zigzag” with a coherent “Protestant programme of action prioritized 
by the Elizabethan government” with the aim of improving prospects for “Calvinist 
internationalism.”2 
 What follows is an alternative to all these characterizations, one that, as noted, finds 
evidence for greater consistency and coherence in Elizabeth’s leadership and less confessional 
“drive.” That she would have been uneasy around religious extremists ought not to astonish us; 
her father’s, step-brother’s, and step-sister’s reigns as well as the start of her own were disturbed 
by zealous subjects, who were bent on shoring up or dismantling the realm’s religious 
settlements.    
   -------------------------------------------------- 
Conflict and Coalitions 
 During the 1570s, King Philip’s ambitions to keep the Netherlands Catholic and to win 
England back for Rome coupled the fate of the Dutch rebellion with that of Queen Elizabeth’s 
regime. Philip had married Elizabeth’s half-sister and predecessor Mary Tudor in 1554 and had 
lived in their realm for thirteen months, but he was occupied elsewhere when she died in 1558. 
He never returned to his wife’s realm. When Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, sought refuge there 
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and seemed a plausible, Catholic candidate to succeed Elizabeth, Philip’s envoys conspired to 
improve her chances. But Spain had more pressing business on the Continent in the 1560s and 
thereafter. 
 For Dutch dissidents opposed King Philip’s proposals to increase the number and 
decrease the size of dioceses. The reorganization would have cost influential abbots healthy 
portions of their endowments and would have diminished the Dutch nobility’s considerable 
influence over local churches. The protests of those likely losers led to the recall of Antoine 
Perrenot de Granvelle, the Low Countries’ leading prelate (and principal architect and advocate 
of the plan). Yet dissidents’ demands escalated. They prevailed upon Philip’s regent, Margaret of 
Parma, to suspend all decrees against heresy, but the religiously reformed preachers--forced from 
pulpits into nearby fields--in retaliation, incited their “sheep” to sack Catholic churches. Still, the 
fear that King Philip meant to export the Spanish Inquisition to the Netherlands and that Spanish 
sovereignty would trump traditional Dutch liberties prompted many Calvinists and Catholics to 
make common cause. Margaret urged Philip to come and ease tensions; he had toured the Low 
Countries more than a decade before and had been well received. But the king sensed that the 
crisis called for more than royal processions and receptions.  So, in 1567, he dispatched Don 
Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba, who quickly earned a reputation for ruthlessness.3 
 Prince William of Orange and his brother, Louis of Nassau, rallied the resistance, but 
Alba’s feints and dodges denied the rebels anything remotely resembling the decisive victory 
that could have inspired widespread Dutch and foreign support for the insurrection. William’s 
initiative was frustrated at nearly every turn and has been called a military and public relations 
“fiasco.”4  By contrast, rebel mariners had significant successes at sea. Elizabeth permitted them 
(“pyrates,” according to Alba; “sea beggars” to their friends) to resupply in several of her realm’s 
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ports. The Dutch mariners were, in effect, her allies “off the books” in England’s unofficial trade 
war with Philip. Spain, of course, complained. Repeatedly, into the early 1570s, Alba’s agents in 
England urged the queen to demilitarize her coast. Early in 1572, she complied.5 
 Alba got what he wanted but not what he expected. The deported “pirates” descended on 
the Dutch coast, capturing Brielle weeks after the English sent them packing.  They took several 
cities in quick succession and gave the insurgency what historian Peter Arnade calls its “second 
wind.”6 Historians concur but disagree about England’s and Elizabeth’s part in the rebels’ 
resurgence. That the queen first defied Alba then acquiesced and finally had the sea beggars cast 
off could illustrate what her modern critics call “hesitations and gyrations,” although Olaf Mörke 
plausibly contends that Elizabeth’s responses to Alba were calculated to wage “a cold war”--but 
to keep it from coming to a boil.7 
 A small English expeditionary force was sent to Flushing two months after Elizabeth 
evicted the Dutch mariners in 1572. Her move looks to have been a modest measure to protect 
her realm’s commerce with Antwerp--from the French as much as from Alba--rather than a bold 
strike to ensure the beggars’ conquest and command of the coast.  The rebels’ partisans hoped to 
have a larger English presence, but they were disappointed.8 Alba weathered consecutive months 
of misfortune after Brielle fell to the rebels.  He held important cities in Zeeland, yet his soldiers 
there and elsewhere had no pay for long periods.  Word reached England that his garrisons were 
“in gret penurye.” King Philip recalled him in 1573 and appointed Luis de Requesens to succeed 
him.9 Yet Spain’s military offensives during the next several years were generally unproductive.  
Prince William’s position improved. Swatches of rebels acknowledged him as supreme 
commander. He and his agents were authorized by delegates to the Estates General to negotiate 
for foreign aid.  But obstacles seemed insurmountable. How could he impress prospective allies 
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with the insurgency’s chances when so much of the Netherlands remained in his enemy’s hands? 
In 1575, guests invited to his wedding were warned they would find travel to the ceremonies 
treacherous.10 
 What may have most vexed Prince William, however, was the anxiety among Catholic 
insurgents, who were unsure of his ability to control Calvinist extremists, dispossessed by Alba 
in the late 1560s and ready for revenge in the early 1570s.  Catholics frequently fled the regions 
rebels overran, and Catholic malcontents in the rebel ranks looked beyond William.  From their 
perspective, it was best to “break [his] monopoly.”11  In 1577, they invited Archduke Matthias, 
twenty-year-old son of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, to become governor-general. 
William did not seem to object; instead, he mentored and almost immediately mastered the 
inexperienced youth, but--with that maneuver--we have stepped into the first months of 1578, 
well ahead of our story, and we should acknowledge that, both before and after the archduke’s 
arrival, Prince William labored to reduce the tensions between Dutch Calvinist insurgents and 
Dutch Catholics who served with or supported them. He promoted religious tolerance. The 
Pacification of Ghent, signed in 1576, in the aftermath of a Spanish mutiny that torched parts of 
Antwerp, proscribed persecution of the religiously reformed. Efforts to that end, however, failed.  
Calvinist worship was disallowed or disrupted in provinces other than Holland and Zeeland, and 
Catholics in those two provinces had reason to fear the consequences when they practiced their 
religion publicly. Enduring antagonisms wrecked nearly every experiment with religious 
pluralism.12 
 Frances Yates, presuming Elizabeth’s indulgence, suggested that the queen approved 
wholeheartedly of such experiments.  She did, after all, declare her concern for the safety of 
French Calvinists.13 Yet, in 1570, she also confided that any Valois resolve to leave them in 
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peace was not at all “agreeable with [her] action and proceedings against [her] subjects [who] 
lately sought . . . the libertie to use the Roman religion.”14 William was wise, therefore, not to 
urge his scheme on the queen.  Her agent William Davison reported that the prince hoped she 
would have a “tender regard” for all her subjects but that he came no closer to criticism of 
intolerance in England.15 Orange’s letters to Elizabeth and to the ultra-Protestant interventionists 
in her realm rarely commented on confessional interests.  Dutch appeals for English aid were not 
faith-based. They underscored the military rather than the religious predicaments that Elizabeth’s 
subjects would face if her government failed the prince and his partisans.  England, William said, 
was “voyd of stronghouldes to staye [an] enemy any whyle,” so--being “neighbored” by Spain to 
the southwest, it could ill afford having Philip’s regents in the Netherlands establish an arsenal to 
its east.16 
 Orange’s arguments for more abundant and conspicuous English support for the Dutch 
insurgency were less effective stirring the queen’s regime than was Philip’s appointment of an 
ambitious new regent after Requesens’s death in 1576. Don John of Austria was known for his 
military prowess and militant Catholicism. Whereas Alba, when he had commanded the Spanish 
troops in the Netherlands, thought the conquest of England unworkable, Don John considered the 
invasion of England an obvious sequel to his pacification of the Netherlands. He planned to cross 
the Channel, storm ashore, depose Elizabeth, and marry Mary Stuart, disclosing his plans to the 
Queen of Scots’s partisans in France, who were said to be receptive to his requests for help.17 
 Bishop Richard Curteys of Chichester told Elizabeth’s Council that Catholics in his 
diocese grew “worse and worse,” referring, it seems, to their insolence, as rumors about Don 
John’s imminent invasion reached them.18 Perhaps to prevent his celebrity from deflating the 
queen’s confidence in Prince William’s abilities, the realm’s ultra-Protestants expressed fresh 
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confidence in his resourcefulness. Yet, as their sovereign’s eyes, ears, and advisers, they were 
also obliged to report challenges that appeared to overtax his gifts and resources: he could not 
keep Calvinist troops from misbehaving while defending predominantly Catholic regions, and 
his strategies for reconciling disaffected Catholic rebels and Calvinist extremists and for forging 
a united front against Spain were ultimately undermined by the “particularism” that plagued the 
seventeen provinces, especially as regional resentments were exacerbated by confessional 
commitments.19 Despite his efforts, the latter were turning the insurrection into a series of civil 
wars.20 One pamphleteer portrayed Prince William as a Dutch Brutus, admirably bent on 
contesting Caesar’s (King Philip’s) right to reign yet finally and woefully incapable of achieving 
a consensus among those Catholics, Calvinists, Gelderlanders, Ghentois, and others, whose 
reciprocal antipathies gave Spain reasons to believe that its commanders could ultimately divide 
and reconquer.21 The English government, informed of all this, was unlikely to think that 
William was flirting with success.  Francis Walsingham’s copybook mentions that “dissensions 
in the [Low] Countries” vexed delegates to the Estates General, trying to collect revenues for 
collective defense--“dissensions” that resulted in defections.22 
 Defections were common after Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, joined forces with 
Don John and after Spain’s decisive win at a battle near the village of Gembloux in early 1578.  
Most rebel casualties were Catholics, but, as Rolf Bremmer suspects, Gembloux was “a heavy 
blow” for all insurgents to absorb (een geduchte klap).23 Setbacks followed: Gravelines soon 
capitulated to Don John; Parma took Maastricht. The year 1578 would be critical for William 
and Elizabeth. 
    --------------------------------------- 
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1578 
 Prince William worked overtime to avoid his coalition’s collapse. He appealed to France 
for assistance.  He courted François Hercule d’Valois, duke of Anjou, King Henry III’s younger 
brother. As early as 1575, rumors circulated in Spain that Anjou was eager to lead an army of 
French Calvinists into the Netherlands to fight alongside the Dutch rebels.24 He seemed just as 
eager in 1578, notwithstanding the efforts of his brother and redoubtable mother, Catherine de 
Medici, to dissuade him.25  At that later date, Anjou was no longer friendly with the religiously 
reformed in France, so he led a largely Catholic force into the Low Countries. For their part, the 
English ultra-Protestants were livid. Walsingham had been in Paris in 1572, during the massacre 
of Calvinists there, and mistrusted the “underhanded” French, although he and his queen had no 
choice but to accept their intervention. Prince William was resolved; still, Walsingham weighed 
in, warning the Dutch, early in 1578, against indulging the duke.  And even after Elizabeth had 
warmed to Orange’s and the Estate General’s new Valois ally, Walsingham expressed grave 
reservations about Angevin involvement.26 
 At first, Elizabeth had been as anxious as Walsingham remained. She insisted that only 
an imperceptive statesman could have missed the obvious, namely, that English support for the 
insurgency, from 1570, had been proffered to keep the French away.27 William was aware of the 
“obvious” yet complained that English support fell far short of Dutch expectations, implying that 
the consequences of the shortfall--Parma’s and Don John’s conquests during the first few months 
of 1578--should have alarmed the queen and her Council, inasmuch as the insurgents and Estates 
General, as a result, “standeth on . . . terms of extremitie.”  William conceded that inviting Anjou 
was risky, but, he continued, no good alternative presented itself.28 
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 Elizabeth supplied an alternative. She sent and subsidized a surrogate, John Casimir, son 
of the Elector Palatine. William apparently welcomed him, if only to have Calvinist Casimir, as a 
counterweight to balance Catholic Anjou and presumably to improve the prospects for a 
confessionally bipartisan rebel front.  But neither duke--Casimir nor Anjou--proved able to 
control what James Tracy describes as the “ill paid and ill-disciplined troops” each brought with 
him.29  Casimir caused additional difficulties for Prince William (and Elizabeth) by encouraging 
religiously reformed extremists whose “greate instancy” or impetuosity, the queen was told, had 
incensed Catholics and moderates in Ghent.30 Ghentois moderates blamed England; Ambassador 
William Davison relayed that news late in 1578, yet, by then, without allowing that the fault was 
hers, Elizabeth had reevaluated her collaboration with Casimir.  As we learned, she changed her 
mind about Anjou’s initiatives--and about Anjou. The English ultra-Protestants learned to their 
dismay that French emissaries would soon be at their queen’s Court “to break ageyn into the 
matter of mariadg.”31 
 English ultra-Protestants believed their queen’s “cold dealing” with the Dutch rebels was 
responsible for Prince William’s partnership with Anjou.32  And many English Calvinists would 
have been delighted with the ostensible thaw, had Elizabeth not opened pre-nuptial negotiations. 
She must have known that news of her revived interest in the Anjou match would distress many 
religiously reformed subjects, even though any surviving offspring of that match would have 
excluded the Catholic Queen of Scots from the succession. Yet Elizabeth had no wish to sift 
matrimonially-related pros and cons with her Council. During the summer of 1578, traveling 
through Suffolk and Norfolk, she kept Leicester at arm’s length. Historian Patrick Collinson is 
certain that “never before or after, in the correspondence among themselves” did Leicester and 
Walsingham “do less to disguise the fact that they had the greatest difficulty in inclining their 
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queen to their way of thinking.”33 Walsingham, who was abroad at the time, was cautioned to 
keep his displeasure under wraps.34 So, with little prompting from her subjects who displayed 
greatest interest in international Protestantism, their queen determined that her realm’s safety 
depended on Dutch rebels’ abilities to preoccupy the Spanish, which, in turn, depended on 
Anjou’s participation in their insurrection. And she seems also to have decided that flirting with 
the duke--perhaps marrying him, if it came to that--looked to be a last brass, if the scales needed 
tipping to that end.35 
 Or was it love? Was Elizabeth as seriously smitten as Ilona Bell suggests? Bell finds the 
queen’s letters to Anjou “heavy with the language of love” A sonnet “On Monsieur’s Departure” 
that Bell attributes to Elizabeth casts the narrator as a second Dido.36 Yet we cannot be confident 
that the queen had a hand in that sonnet’s composition, and the rhetoric of the letters, which may 
have been literary exercises, seems too slender a thread to support the idea that the usually 
strategic, spinster queen was pining for a duke, twenty years her junior.  But this is not to 
question that Elizabeth was in love with being courted. Nearly all historians writing about the 
courtship’s early innings concede that she enjoyed her young suitor’s attention, and most who 
attend to its late phase (from summer, 1578 to the duke’s death in 1583) mention her romance 
with romance. But Bell’s slender thread is the only support for objections to the generalization 
that, on matrimonial matters, Elizabeth usually led with her head, not with her heart.37 
 Nor did her faith dictate her policy. She seems not to have been tempted in 1578 by the 
ultra-protestants’ efforts to cobble together an international Calvinist coalition. Conceivably, she 
rekindled Anjou’s interest in marriage that year to explore an alternative. Maybe the Angevin 
courtship was part of an ambitious yet relatively low-cost plan to “breed pikes” in the 
Netherlands, to prompt England’s enemies, France and spendthrift Spain, to battle to exhaustion 
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well away from England. Those pikes and the idea surface in a letter that Nicholas Bacon, Lord 
Keeper of the Great Seal, sent to Walsingham. Bacon believed that the duke’s opportunism and 
arrogance could be turned to English advantage. Anjou, he guessed, would eventually refuse to 
play second fiddle to Prince William, defy both the Dutch Estates General and Spain, and seize 
parts of the Dutch provinces for himself. “That Spain will endure” the seizure was improbable, 
yet, with Anjou “bringing [what he seized] within the governance of France,” Bacon could not 
“see that the French king will suffer him to lose it.”38 
 Religiously reformed polemicists continued to fret about Anjou’s religion. Had Elizabeth 
been attracted to the ultra-Protestants’ dreams of an international Protestant coalition, she would 
likely have fretted as well.39  But, if I am correct, she construed the Angevin match as a possible 
answer to an enduring foreign policy question: how might her realm keep a hand in the business 
of war without having it lopped off.  To Bacon and Elizabeth, by 1578, keeping the Netherlands 
unquiet seems to have replaced other objectives that spurred the queen to offer herself as go-
between and mediator. But “breed[ing] pikes,” to some extent, was consistent with what she and 
her regime had been doing during the 1570s, propping up Prince William just enough so that the 
Dutch “not [be] opprest.”40 Anjou was a prop, buttressing the Dutch, battling Spain, and, should 
Bacon have his way, setting the French and Spanish at each other’s throats in the Low Countries. 
    --------------------------------------------------- 
Conclusion 
 Elizabeth did not share English ultra-Protestants’ confidence in Prince William’s ability 
to draw the Dutch Calvinists together and into an international Protestant league before, during, 
or after 1578. Nor did his effort to promote religious tolerance in the Low Countries strike her as 
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a compelling reason to intervene decisively. The effort looked to be doomed as long as Spanish 
troops’ successes frightened Calvinists and emboldened Catholics.  Could the latter have helped 
perceiving Don John’s and Parma’s advances as symptoms of Catholic resurgence?  How could 
Dutch Calvinists have doused suspicions that their Catholic countrymen would ultimately form 
fifth columns in areas controlled by the religiously reformed yet threatened by King Philip’s 
commanders? Moreover, even the Catholics who opposed Spain’s regents in the Netherlands 
would have seen their churches desecrated and their coreligionists serving as magistrates ousted 
by Calvinist neighbors. Dutch Catholics, that is, could be excused for having thought that Prince 
William’s efforts to guarantee them freedom to worship in regions under Protestant control were 
ineffective if not also insincere or, as one historian speculated, sneaky (geniepige).41 Was 
William decreeing tolerance merely to buy time, to forestall confrontations in which the 
numerical superiority of Netherlanders professing the old faith would tell in their favor? 
 What may have troubled Elizabeth more than William’s difficulties winning Dutch 
Catholics’ trust was his failure to control unruly Calvinist extremists. The problem, on that 
count, was structural as well personal, for Dutch Calvinism was bishop-less. And that deficit 
accounted for the kind of pluriformity that the English queen believed to be treacherous. She 
relied on her bishops to preserve religious uniformity.  From the 1560s, the English critics of 
episcopacy were relentless; the hierarchy of their established church seemed to them warmed-
over Catholicism. To Elizabeth, however, a bench of bishops was the mainstay of an adequately 
reformed religious settlement. She resisted those critics’ efforts, from the start of her reign to its 
end, to confiscate bishops’ estates and to force her mitred proprietors to live--as little more than 
diocesan notaries--on petty pensions.  She very likely judged the Dutch Calvinists’ discipline in 
the light of her experience trying to bridle their friends in her realm who were fond of the way 
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Calvinism on the Continent had developed.  But neither the Swiss nor Prince William saw the 
need for religiously reformed bishops. The latter apparently did not think Protestant pluriformity 
was repulsive; Elizabeth did. That difference, combined with other factors discussed here, quite 
possibly discouraged the English queen from heavily investing in the Dutch rebellion, That she 
pilloried Archbishop Grindal, whom, as we learned at the start, ultra-Protestants supported, 
might suggest as much, for he was thought to have encouraged pluriformity among the realm’s 
religiously reformed. In 1576, speaking for Elizabeth and against Grindal, Nicholas Bacon 
maintained that pluriformity was tantamount to “nulliformity” or anarchy.42 
 Still, notwithstanding structural problems that the unsettled confessional affairs in the 
Low Countries exhibited to Elizabeth and England, the queen and her Council seem determined 
not to abandon William and the insurgents to the Spanish. True, English policy and practice did 
not serve the rebels as well as they hoped they might during the 1570s. And landmark successes 
that were later anticipated when one of the queen’s favorites, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, 
accompanied Anjou to Antwerp (in 1582) were not forthcoming.  Leicester soon left, and the 
tensions between François Hercule and the Estates General, which expected to keep him on a 
short leash, disappointed Prince William and drove the duke to distraction until his death the 
following year.43 William, for his part, tried to appease delegates to the Estates General. In 
theory, according to J.J. Woltjer, the assembly could have well served--and have been well 
served by--its field commander. In theory--as long as Orange did not pound piston-like the 
delegates or the more prosperous Dutch cities with unreasonable requests--his prerogatives, the 
cities’ autonomy, and the Estates’s authority ought to have been preserved, even as concessions 
accommodated war-time crises and avoided political and social destabilization.  But in practice, 
disequilibrium prevailed.44 
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 As Elizabeth and England looked on, confessional differences among the Dutch thwarted 
Prince William’s attempts to build coalitions during the 1570s. The queen could not overlook the 
malcontents’ complaints and recriminations to see what ultra-Protestants on her Council saw, the 
makings of an international Calvinist collaborative. Nor did she share the vision often attributed 
to Orange and his close associates, which surfaces in the conviction among some historians that 
“a new state [was] emerg[ing]” in the late 1570s, “in coexistence, and as if in interaction, with a 
complex and fiercely defended religious diversity.”45 To the end of that decade--and probably to 
William’s assassination in 1584, Elizabeth saw things differently; so she put off the Spanish, 
propped up the Dutch--to a point--and kept wars from her shores. 
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 1 I use “Netherlands” and “Low Countries” interchangeably. The former term was increasingly popular 
from the 1560s, although the English, then and during the next decades, commonly referred to the seventeen 
provinces that sent deputies to the Estates General as “Flanders.” For terminology, see Alastair Duke, “The Elusive 
Netherlands: The Question of National Identity,” Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis 171 
(2005): 187-88; for the “Protestant ultras,” consult Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967) 199, but also Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s “Arcadia” and 
Elizabethan Politics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 50-53.  Collinson’s ultras were always apprehensive 
that Elizabeth would favor those who “flattered her own more cautious thoughts” and who became Grindal’s (and 
their) fiercest critics. But what is most important for our purposes is that the English ultra-Protestants urged the 
queen not to underestimate “the international peril facing Protestantism,” as Worden confirms, and not to 
minimize the “need for international cooperation to withstand it.” 
  
 2  Accusations of inconsistency, insincerity, or indifference--for which, see inter alia, Paul Hammer, 
Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government, and Society in Tudor England, 1544 - 1604 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, 111; R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485 – 1588, New York: 
Norton, 1966), 336; Wallace T. McCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572 – 1588, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 272-73; and Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt in the Netherlands, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 136--either overlook or undervalue Elizabeth’s persistent attempts 
to broker peace between Dutch insurgents and King Philip. Simon Adams, “Elizabeth I and the Sovereignty of the 
Netherlands, 1576 – 1585,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series 14 (2004): 315-17 convincingly 
puts the queen’s efforts back into play. David J. B. Trim, “Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience 
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on the Continent, 1558 – 1585,” in Tudor England and Its Neighbors, ed. Glenn Richardson and Susan Doran  
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 139-77, however, emphasizes Elizabeth’s religious motives, developing 
arguments introduced in E. I. Kouri, “For True Faith or National Interest? Queen Elizabeth I and the Protestant 
Powers,” in Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. 
Tom Scott and E. I. Kouri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), 411-36. Nonetheless, Kouri (425-26) concedes that 
Elizabeth’s leadership of international Protestantism existed mainly in the minds of would-be Calvinist allies on the 
Continent and that the queen “preferred to pursue a policy of officially correct neutrality” in the 1560s, and--I will 
argue--less scrupulously, yet still circumspectly well into the 1570s. I will also question whether Elizabeth saw as 
clearly as Trim now does that Dutch Calvinists, “by their willingness to defy the military logic of their situation in 
the 1570s, provided the motor for the revolt”; see Trim’s “Conflict, Religion, and Ideology,” in European Warfare, 
1350-1750, ed. Trim and Frank Tallet Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289. 
.  
 3 See Margaret’s letter to Philip, July 1567, Correspondance français de Marguerite d”Autriche, Duchesse 
de Parme avec Philippe II, 3 vols. ed. J. S. Theissen (Utrecht: Kemink, 1925 - 1942) 1: 385-86. Consult J. Andriessen, 
“De katholieken te Antwerpen,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van het Zuiden van Nederland 70 (1987): 62-63, for 
Alba’s “repressiepolitieck,” and, for depictions of Alba as “God’s rod” and wrath and depictions of his troops as 
hellish monsters, see Daniel Horst, De opstand in zwart-wit: Propagandaprenten mit de Nederlandse (Zutphen: 
Walburg, 2003) 92-94 and 102. 
 
 4 Maarten Hageman, Het kwade exempel van Gelre: De stad Nijmegen, de Beeldenstorm, ende Rand van 
Beroerten, 1566 – 1568 (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2005), 252. 
 
 5 See the queen’s instructions in British Library, Additional MS. 32323, 34v. To sample Spain’s protests, 
Alba’s complaints, and England’s responses just prior to the queen’s and regime’s compliance, review Relations 
politiques Pay-Bas et de l’Angleterre sous le régne de Philippe II, 11 vols., ed. Joseph Marie Bruno Constantin, 
Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: Hayez, 1882 - 1900) 6: 321-59. 
 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 6  Peter Arnade, Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2008) 203-204.  J. C. A. De Meij, De watergeuzen en de Nederlanded, 1568 - 
1572 (Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche Uitgever, 1972), 234 claims that coastal locals had warned Alba who told 
them to be vigilant (“geode wacht de houden”) but was too worried about French overland incursions to redeploy 
troops. 
 
 7 See Olaf Mörke, Wilhelm van Oranien (1533 – 1584): Fürst und “Vater” der Republik (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 2007), 148-50. 
 
 8 See the letter from the citizens of Flushing to Elizabeth, March, 1572, Relations politiques 6: 490-91. 
 
 9  Brune to Burleigh, October 19, 1573, Relations politiques 6: 836. For the new regent’s moderation, see 
Monique Weis,  Les Pays-Bas Espagnols et les Etats du Saint Empire (1559 – 1579): Priorities et enjeux diplomatie 
en temps de troubles (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2003), 341-42. 
 
 10  See the letter from Jan van Nassau to Philips van Marnix, May 7, 1575, De onuitgegeven briefwisseling 
van Marnix van Sint-Aldegonde, ed. Aloïs Gerlo (Brussels: Interuniversitair Instituut voor Studie van de Renaissance 
en het Humanisme, 1985), 23. 
 
 
 11 Eric Aerts, “Spanje of Oranje? Loyale en dissidente regenkamers in Brabant en Vlanderen bij het begin 
de tachtigjarige oorlog (1577 – 1585),” Miscellanea archivistica studia 118 (1999): 36-37; for the Catholic refugees, 
see Geert Janssen, “Quo Vadis? Catholic Perceptions of Flight and the Revolt of the Low Countries, 1566 – 1609,” 
Renaissance Quarterly 64 (2011): 478-83. Judith Pollmann, Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 
1520 - 1635 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 106 mentions the malcontents’ reactions to Orange’s 
“monopoly.” 
 
 12  Alastair Duke, Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries (London: Continuum, 2003), 224-25. 
 
 13 Frances Yates, Valois Tapestries, reprint  edition (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999). 107-108. 
 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  
 14 “Instructions” to Francis Walsingham, August, 1570, British Library, Harleian MS. 36, 98v-99r.  
 
 15 Davison to Leicester, April 17, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 411. 
 
 16  See Prince William’s discourses “at soundry times,” paraphrased by William Herle in 1573, British 
Library, Harleian MS. 1583, 199r-201v; Lord Burleigh’s memorandum, October 17, 1575, Relations politiques 7: 
597; and Leicester’s letter to Wilson, October 18, 1577, Relations politiques 10: 26-27. 
 
 17  For knowledge in England of Don John’s conversations with the Guise in France, see Thomas Wilson’s 
letter to Davison, August 30, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, Foreign 83/2, 125. The English likely expected 
that alliances of that sort would be complicated--and eventually compromised--by Spanish Gallophobia, for which, 
consult Jean Michel Ribera, Diplomatie et espionage: Les ambassadeurs du roi de France auprès de Phillipe II du 
traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (Paris: Champion, 2007), 341-47.  Yet influential papal 
nincio, Niccolò Ormaneto, expressed support for Don John’s scheme was in place even before Philip’s regent 
arrived in the Netherlands; see P.O. De Törne, Don Juan d’Autriche et les projets de conquête de l’Angleterre, 
1568-1578, 2 vols. (Abo: Acta Academica Aboentis, 1915 - 1930) 2: 60-62.  
 
 18  Curteys to Walsingham, March 24, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, 12/111, 113. 
 
 19  For the deployment of Calvinist troops, see James D. Tracy, The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, 
Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572 – 1588 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156-57; for ultra-Protestants’ 
insistence on William’s abilities and popularity among “the multitude,” see Davison’s letter to Leicester, October 
27, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, Foreign 83/3, 75.  But, for William’s unpopularity, see J. Decavele, “De 
mislukking van Oranjes ‘democratische’ politiek in Vlaanderen,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de 
geschiedenis des Nederlanden 99 (1984): 625-27. 
 
  
 20  See Guy Malengrau, L’esprit particulariste et la révoltion des Pays-Bas au XVIª siècle (1578 – 1584) 
(Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1936), 64-67; Rolf H. Bremmer, Reformatie en Rebellie: Willem van Oranje, 
de calvinisten en het recht van opstand tien onstuimige jaren, 1572 – 1581 (Franeker: Wever, 1984), 216; and 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
James D. Tracy, For Holland’s Garden: The War Aims of the States of Holland, 1572 – 1588  (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdams Centrum voor de studie van de Gouden Eeuw, 2004) 24-25. 
  
 21  Pieter Geurts, De Nederlandse opstand in de pamfletten, 1566 – 1584 (Nijmegen: Centrale Drukkerij, 
1956), 276. 
 
 22  See the undated entry, National Archives, State Papers, 104/163, 88r-91v. 
 
 23  Bremmer, Reformatie, 158-59. 
 
 24 Pierre Ernest to Requesens, September 23, 1575, Correspondance du Cardinal Granvelle, 1565 - 1586, 
12 vols., ed. Edmond Poullet and Charles Piot (Brussels: Hayez, 1877 - 1896), 5: 614. 
 
 25  See Henry III’s letter to Catherine de Medici, June 28, 1578, Lettres de Henri III, Roi de France, 7 vols., 
ed. Jacqueline Boucher, Pierre Champion, and Michel François (Paris: Klincksieck, 1959 - 2006) 4: 30-32. 
 
 26 Walsingham to Paulet, January 14, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 78/2, 5v and Walsingham’s 
later reflections on “whether it be good for Her Majestie to assist the duke d’Anjou,” November, 1581, British 
Library, Harleian MS. 1582, 39v. 
 
 27  The instructions to John Hastings issued on October 29, 1575, British Library, Harleian MS. 285, 26v-
27r, were explicit on that count. 
 
 28 As argued in a note to John Sommers, August, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 722. 
 
 29  Tracy, Dutch Republic, 141. 
 
 30  Cobham and Walsingham to Queen Elizabeth, July 6, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 571. Casimir 
teamed with Peter Dathenus, whom moderate Calvinists attempted to exclude from synodical deliberations; for 
which, see Thomas Tilius’s letter to Arnold Crusius, April, 1577, “Briefwisseling van Thomas Tilius,” Bijdragen en 
mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 55 (1934): 129.  For Dathenus, see Willem Nijenhuis, “Varianten 
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
binnen het Nederlandse Calvinisme in de zestiende eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 89 (1976): 364. And, for 
Casimir’s prior acquaintance with Dathenus, whom he earlier invited to a Palatine conference of Calvinists, see 
Johannes Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 1566 bis 1648: Politische-konfessionelle 
Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 179.   
 
 31 Burghley to Cobham and Walsingham, july 29, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 660. For Davison’s later 
analysis, see his letter to Walsingham, November 17, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 83/10, 37v-38r. 
 
 32  Leicester to Walsingham, August 29, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 83/8, 55. 
 
 33 Patrick Collinson, “Pulling the Strings: Religion and Politics in the Progress of 1578,” The Progresses, 
Pageants, and Entertainments of Queen Elizabeth I, ed. Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring, and Sarah 
Knight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 124. 
 
 34  Leicester to Walsingham, August 1, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 679-80. 
 
 35 Susan Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I (London: Routledge, 1996), 210-
11 suspects that Burghley tipped the queen in that direction.  
  
 36 Ilona Bell, Elizabeth I: The Voice of a Monarch (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 151-59. 
 
 37 Natalie Mears, “Love-Making and Diplomacy: Elizabeth I and the Anjou Marriage Negotiations, c. 1578 – 
1582,” History 86 (2001): 442-50, is less convinced than I of the importance of the Dutch wars for the Anjou match 
and for policy in general. 
 
 38  Bacon to Walsingham, July 29, 1578, British Library, Harleian MS 168, 94v-95r. Kervyn de Lettenhove 
prints the letter (Relations politiques 10: 633-35), but misattributes it.  
 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 39 John Stubbs, The Discoverie of a gaping gulf whereinto England is likely to be swallowed by another 
French marriage (London 1579) is an excellent specimen of the ultra-Protestant polemicists’ vilification of Anjou, 
predicting that the duke’s retainers, “the scomme of all France, which is the scomme of Europe,” would become 
burdens to England’s taxpayers and would test their queen’s commitment to religious reform (C6v-C7r). Stubbs’s 
screed and similar anti-Anjou literature have long been read as expressions of the ultra-Protestants at Court, but 
the argument that courtiers’ opposition to the match somewhat subsided by the time Stubbs’s Gaping Gulf was 
published has been corroborated by Natalie Mears, “Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship: John Stubbs’s The 
Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf, 1579,” The Historical Journal 44 (2001): 643-48, which maintains that Stubbs’s Gulf 
and similar protests “emerged independently from an articulate, middle-ranking, politically and confessionally 
conscious circle.” 
 
 40 Instructions for John Smith, November, 1576, British Library, Harleian MS. 6992, 61r. 
 
 41 P. J. H. Ubachs, “De nederlandse religieverde van 1578,” Nederlandsch archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 77 
(1997): 41-42. 
 
 42 See the text of Bacon’s address to Parliament, British Library, Harleian MS. 36, 98r-99v. 
 
 43 Frédéric Duquenne, L’entreprise du duc d’Anjou aux Pays-Bas de 1580 à 1584: Les responsabilités d’un 
échec à partager (Villenueve d’Asq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), 73-74 and 114-16. 
 
 44 J. J. Woltjer, Tussen vrijheidsstrijd en burgeroorlog: Over de Nederlandse Opstand, 1555 – 1580 
(Amsterdam: Balans, 1994), 121-22. 
 
 45 Willem Frijhoff, “Religious Toleration in the United Provinces: From Case to Model,” Calvinism and 
Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 29-30. 
 
